“LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE — INDUSTRIAL MANSLAUGHTER PENALTIES: The penalty figures cited (25 years imprisonment and $13.3M fine for individuals; $26.6M for corporations, as updated penalties) should be verified against the current Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) as amended. Penalties were updated by the Work Health and Safety and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2023 (Qld). Verify current figures before publication — these are cited as specific facts and must be accurate.”
“SILICA WES: The respirable crystalline silica WES of 0.05 mg/m³ (8-hour TWA) reflects the Safe Work Australia reduction from 2020. The engineering stone ban (effective 1 July 2024) is accurate. Verify that the 0.05 mg/m³ figure is current as of 2026 — Safe Work Australia may have issued further reductions post-August 2025 (author knowledge cutoff).”
“PSYCHOSOCIAL CODE OF PRACTICE: The Safe Work Australia Model Code of Practice for Psychosocial Hazards at Work (2022) is accurate. Queensland’s adoption should be confirmed against the current Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011 (Qld) and any 2025-2026 updates.”
“CATEGORY 1 PENALTY: The brief states ‘2017 amendments, strengthened 2024’. The 2017 introduction of industrial manslaughter in QLD is accurate. Verify the specific 2024 strengthening against the WHS and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2023 or any 2024 Queensland legislative amendments before publication.”
“ASBESTOS: The obligation to identify asbestos-containing materials in pre-July 1985 (not 2004) buildings is the standard threshold — pre-1985 construction is when asbestos use was most prevalent, though some use continued to 2003. Clarify whether the article should reference pre-1985 buildings (where ACMs are assumed) or pre-2004 buildings (the last date asbestos materials were commercially available in Australia). The article currently uses pre-2003 which aligns with the ban date. Verify this is the right framing.”
Industrial Manslaughter Is Now Personal: What Queensland’s WHS Changes Mean for Your Project
In 2017, Queensland introduced industrial manslaughter as a criminal offence under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. The penalty for an individual convicted of industrial manslaughter: up to 20 years imprisonment. The legislation was not aimed at the abstract concept of a company. It reaches the person whose decision, or failure to decide, contributed to the death.
Since 2017, the legislation has been strengthened. Penalty maximums have increased. The regulatory focus has sharpened. New obligations around silica dust, psychosocial hazards, and asbestos management have been added to the framework. The direction is clear: obligations are getting more specific, penalties are getting larger, and personal liability attached to officers isn’t a theoretical risk.
This article isn’t legal advice. It is a plain-language overview of the framework as it applies to commercial construction in Queensland, including the obligations that fall on clients and project owners, not just builders.
Industrial Manslaughter: The Basics
Section 34C of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) establishes the offence of industrial manslaughter. A person commits industrial manslaughter if they are a person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU) or an officer of a PCBU, and they negligently cause the death of a worker.
The word “negligently” in the legislation is defined as a gross departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise. This isn’t ordinary negligence. It requires a significant failure, one that shows a disregard for the risk to workers.
The current maximum penalties, following the 2023 amendments, are:
- For an individual (including an officer): up to 25 years imprisonment
- For a corporation: up to $13.345 million
These are maximum penalties. They are intended to mark the outer boundary of the offence. But they exist because the legislature decided the original maxima were insufficient.
The personal nature of the liability is what distinguishes industrial manslaughter from other WHS offences. A Category 3 contravention — a failure to comply with a duty without creating a risk of serious harm — carries a fine. A Category 1 contravention — reckless conduct exposing workers to a risk of death or serious injury — carries up to five years imprisonment for individuals. Industrial manslaughter goes further: it requires a death to have occurred, but it also carries the longest custodial sentence in the WHS framework.
The message from the legislature to the individuals who make decisions on construction projects is direct: if those decisions contribute to a death, the personal consequence is significant.
The Client Is a PCBU. This Isn’t Optional.
The most significant point for property owners, developers, and project managers who commission construction work: the client is a Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking.
The PCBU concept under the WHS Act 2011 is broad. It captures any person or entity conducting a business or undertaking in any form, whether for profit or not. A property developer commissioning a commercial building is a PCBU. A government department procuring a school is a PCBU. An investment trust overseeing a commercial fitout is a PCBU.
The duty of a PCBU is to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of workers. On a construction project, this extends to anyone who may be affected by the work, including people working on the site under a head contractor’s management.
I’ve had pre-start conversations with clients who assumed their WHS obligations ended when they appointed a principal contractor. They don’t. The contractor manages the construction workforce. The client retains their PCBU duties alongside.
For clients and owners, the practical obligations include:
Management of overlapping duties. Where multiple PCBUs have overlapping duties in relation to the same risk (for example, the client who retains site access obligations and the contractor who manages the construction workforce), each must meet their duty as far as reasonably practicable. The existence of a principal contractor does not extinguish the client’s duty. It operates alongside it.
Safe design. Under section 22 of the WHS Act, designers of structures must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the structure is designed to be constructed, used, and demolished without risks to health and safety. A client who provides a design brief that creates an inherent construction safety hazard (structural sequences that require work at height without feasible fall protection, for example) may be engaged in a design process that creates a WHS obligation.
Due diligence. Officers of PCBUs — which includes directors, executives, and senior managers who exercise influence over the PCBU’s activities — are required under section 27 to exercise due diligence to ensure the PCBU meets its WHS obligations. This includes understanding the nature of the PCBU’s work, ensuring resources are available to manage risks, verifying that monitoring and reporting systems are in place, and understanding how the PCBU responds to incidents and hazards.
Due diligence is not passive compliance. It is an active obligation to understand what is happening on the project and to ensure that the management structure is capable of meeting it.
Silica: The Standards Have Changed
Respirable crystalline silica (RCS) is generated when silica-containing materials are cut, ground, drilled, or sanded. This includes concrete, sandstone, engineered stone, and many ceramic and porcelain products. The particles produced are small enough to penetrate deep into the lung. Long-term exposure causes silicosis, an incurable progressive lung disease. Prolonged or high-concentration exposure can cause accelerated silicosis within months.
The workplace exposure standard for RCS in Australia was halved in 2020, from 0.1 mg/m³ to 0.05 mg/m³ (8-hour time-weighted average). This is not a target. It is the maximum permissible exposure limit. Exposures must be kept as low as reasonably practicable, not simply below the threshold.
On construction sites, activities that generate RCS include:
- Cutting or grinding concrete, brick, or stone
- Dry sweeping of silica-containing debris
- Demolition of concrete structures
- Core drilling
- Grinding of fibre cement sheeting
- Dry cutting of pavers, tiles, or similar materials
The controls required depend on the exposure level. For high-risk activities, the hierarchy of controls requires consideration of elimination (different methodology), substitution (wet cutting instead of dry), and engineering controls (on-tool dust extraction) before relying on respiratory protective equipment. RPE is a last resort, not a first line of defence.
In July 2024, the use of engineered stone containing more than 1% crystalline silica in benchtops, panels, and similar products was banned across Australia. It is the first time a material has been banned under the model WHS laws. The ban reflects the extreme silicosis risk associated with engineered stone fabrication and installation, which produced a cluster of serious cases in younger workers.
For construction project managers: any work involving cutting or grinding of silica-containing materials requires a risk assessment that identifies the RCS generation and specifies the controls. This is not a precaution. It is an obligation under the WHS Regulation 2011.
Psychosocial Hazards: A New Compliance Obligation
The WHS framework has historically focused on physical hazards. In 2022, Safe Work Australia published the Model Code of Practice: Managing Psychosocial Hazards at Work, which states an expectation that PCBUs identify and manage psychosocial hazards as part of their standard WHS obligations.
Psychosocial hazards are aspects of work that may cause psychological harm: excessive workload, unclear roles, exposure to traumatic events, workplace conflict, bullying and harassment, and poor management practices. Construction is a focus industry for psychosocial risk, both because of high workload pressures at peak delivery phases and because the sector has historically underreported mental health issues.
The Code of Practice does not create new legal obligations beyond what already exists in the WHS Act’s general duty. But it provides a framework that regulators use to assess whether a PCBU has met that duty. A PCBU that has not identified psychosocial hazards in their work environment and does not have systems for reporting and managing them will struggle to demonstrate due diligence if a psychosocial incident becomes a regulatory matter.
For commercial construction projects: this applies to the builder’s workforce and subcontractor workforce. The relevant management systems are the builder’s responsibility. But for clients and project managers, it is relevant context when assessing whether a builder’s WHS management system is current.
Asbestos: Older Buildings and Refurbishment Work
Asbestos-containing materials (ACMs) were used extensively in Australian building construction up to and beyond the late 1980s. The national ban on the importation, supply, use, manufacture, and storage of asbestos-containing products took effect on 31 December 2003. Any building constructed, renovated, or maintained before that date may contain ACMs.
The obligation under Queensland WHS law when conducting refurbishment or maintenance work on a building that may contain ACMs is to manage the asbestos risk. This requires:
An asbestos register for the building (required for commercial premises built before 2004). The register identifies the location, type, and condition of known or suspected ACMs.
An asbestos management plan where ACMs are present or suspected.
Prior to any demolition or refurbishment work that may disturb ACMs: an asbestos survey conducted by a competent person (licensed asbestos assessor for commercial work), identifying ACMs that may be disturbed by the planned work.
Removal of friable ACMs (damaged or degraded asbestos that may release fibres) by a licensed Class A removalist. Non-friable ACMs in limited quantities may be handled differently, but the distinction requires a competent assessment.
The risk of asbestos exposure on a refurbishment project is not hypothetical. ACMs are present in many commercial buildings from the pre-2004 era: floor tiles, ceiling tiles, fire-resistant wall linings, pipe insulation, roof sheeting, and others. The consequence of disturbing an ACM without appropriate controls is both a regulatory failure and a health risk to workers and occupants.
For clients procuring refurbishment work on older buildings: ask for a current asbestos register and management plan before work commences, and confirm that the contractor’s methodology includes pre-works hazardous materials assessment.
How to Verify Your Builder’s WHS Systems Are Real
The WHS management plan is a standard tender submission document. Every builder submits one. The question isn’t whether the document exists, but whether it describes systems that are used.
The markers of a WHS system that operates rather than just exists:
The SWMS library is project-specific. Generic SWMS copied from a template but not reviewed for the specific activities, site conditions, and sequence of the project in question are a compliance document, not a management tool. Ask to see the SWMS for a high-risk activity on a previous project. If it reads identically to the one for the current project, it wasn’t site-specific.
I’ve reviewed SWMS packages that were copy-pasted from a previous project. Different site. Different trade. Same document. The job-specific hazards weren’t in it. The people doing the work hadn’t read it.
Incident and near-miss reporting data exists. A construction project that runs for six months with zero reported near misses is not safer than one with reported incidents. It is less transparent. A builder who can show their near-miss reporting rate and what was learned from each reported event is operating a functioning safety reporting culture. One who shows a blank incident register is showing that their workforce doesn’t report.
Safety leadership is visible. The site safety plan describes who is accountable for WHS on site and how safety is integrated into the weekly programme. The safety induction for trade partners is specific to the site, not a generic video.
The builder can explain their silica management controls for concrete cutting work. The answer should describe the hierarchy of controls: wet cutting, on-tool extraction, RPE. If the answer is “we provide P2 masks,” that is not a silica management plan.
These are not unreasonable questions for a client or project manager to ask. A builder with functioning WHS systems will answer them without hesitation.
The Bottom Line
The WHS obligations on a Queensland construction project sit with multiple parties. The builder manages the site. The client manages the project. Both are PCBUs. Both have duties under the WHS Act 2011. Neither can transfer their obligation entirely to the other.
The industrial manslaughter provisions make the personal stakes explicit. They are designed to reach the person whose decisions matter: the site supervisor who tolerated a known hazard, the director who did not fund adequate safety systems, the project manager who pressured workers to proceed with work that was not safe.
The question isn’t whether your builder has a safety plan. It is whether the plan describes a system that is active on your project.
VelpasConn’s WHS management systems are integrated with the V-Method and reviewed on every project. Site safety performance is included in the weekly Status Line. We do not treat safety as separate from project management: a site shutdown is a programme event.